At a time when next season’s flu planning should be firmly underway — and with the H5N1 bird flu emerging as a mounting public health threat — the United States is setting itself back.

The experts charged with preparing us for these disease threats have been temporarily relieved from duty — upcoming meetings of the Food and Drug Administration’s Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory Committee (VRBPAC) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) have been canceled or postponed with no clear explanation. It is unclear whether future sessions will proceed at all.

In January, the United States withdrew from the World Health Organization (WHO), severing a vital link in global influenza surveillance. Despite a ban on interactions with WHO, the CDC and FDA recently received a special exemption to attend February’s vaccine strain selection meeting for the 2025–2026 season — seemingly a reassuring step. Yet beneath that partial reengagement lies a deeper crisis of transparency and scientific rigor.

On March 13, 2025, in a closed-door interagency meeting, the FDA moved forward with selecting the 2025–2026 flu vaccine strains without convening its usual VRBPAC meeting for public deliberation. Notably, the Department of Defense participated in the discussion, with its attendee Dr. Anthony Fries presenting military influenza surveillance and midseason vaccine effectiveness data — an unusual role for the Defense Department in a process that has historically been led by civilian public health agencies like the CDC and FDA.

The unprecedented reliance on Defense Department input over the usual open advisory process raises concerns about transparency and whether the 2025-2026 flu vaccine recommendations were made with the most robust, globally informed data available. This move undercuts a system that has long given Americans confidence in vaccine safety and efficacy, removing the very forums where seasoned scientists evaluate global surveillance data, manufacturing constraints and population needs in an open, accountable manner.

Worse still, the CDC has not contributed any new influenza data to WHO’s key tracking platforms — FluNet and FluID — since Jan. 24. Although U.S. representatives technically “attended” the WHO meeting online, the disruption in sharing current epidemiological information limits both domestic and international partners. Instead, the FDA’s recommendation is based on the Defense Department’s Global Emerging Infections Surveillance program, which tracks influenza and other emerging threats in military populations and is not part of the World Health Organization’s Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System, which typically forms the foundation for global flu strain selection.

The Defense Department program relies on real-time epidemiological data from public health laboratories worldwide, ensuring an evidence-based, internationally coordinated vaccine recommendation. In contrast, WHO’s program focuses on military readiness and force protection, which — while valuable — does not replace the comprehensive global data-sharing that drives the most effective flu vaccine decisions.

With real-time data missing, the broader community is left guessing about which strains are circulating in the United States right now — an especially concerning blind spot given the threat of H5N1 and the constant mutation of seasonal flu viruses.

Each February, WHO uses global surveillance data to recommend which flu strains most urgently warrant coverage in Northern Hemisphere vaccines. In March, the FDA—advised by VRBPAC—finalizes which strains American vaccine makers will include. By June, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices typically votes to add the chosen vaccine to the immunization schedule, triggering critical insurance coverage under the Affordable Care Act. Because it can take six months from strain selection to vaccine distribution, any delay may hamper production, erode public confidence, and leave communities vulnerable if the chosen strains are inaccurately matched.

Flu crosses borders without pause, which is why global coordination is so critical. Halting or delaying data sharing undercuts WHO’s flu surveillance program and weakens collective preparedness. If H5N1 mutates to spread more easily among humans, an up-to-date international intelligence network could mean the difference between an isolated outbreak and a full-blown crisis.

The fallout extends well beyond logistics. An opaque, closed-door strain selection process undermines public faith in vaccination itself. Americans already wary of government decisions may question a recommendation made without open scientific dialogue, creating fertile ground for vaccine hesitancy. Such skepticism hits older adults, children and the immunocompromised hardest — people whose health depends most on timely and effective flu shots.

Communities with limited health care access stand to suffer disproportionately too. Rural areas and low-income neighborhoods, which already face challenges in getting preventive care, could see even lower vaccination rates in the face of confusion or skepticism about how vaccines are chosen and whether they will be available in time.

Despite the current predicament, there is still a way to rebuild trust and transparency. The United States should immediately resume sharing influenza data with WHO’s databases, providing the most accurate picture of circulating strains. Additionally, the FDA’s vaccine advisory committee and the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices must be allowed to reconvene publicly, restoring their essential role in reviewing evidence, hearing expert input and making vaccine recommendations in a transparent forum.

A single exemption for virtual attendance at a WHO meeting — or a closed-door FDA recommendation — does not repair the damage done by withdrawing from international collaboration and halting the steady flow of fresh data. Preventing flu deaths — still a significant cause of morbidity and mortality each season — requires active cooperation with global partners and adherence to time-tested advisory processes at home. Abandoning these tried-and-true methods courts confusion, undermines vaccine effectiveness and endangers the public’s health.

Politics should not overshadow science. Global health isolationism threatens our national wellbeing rather than making it stronger. Our response to the flu, like our response to any infectious threat, demands global collaboration, robust transparency and a commitment to placing public health above all else.

Dr. Spreeha Choudhury is a pharmacist and attorney with Epstein Becker Green in Newark, New Jersey. Richard Hughes IV is a partner with Epstein Becker Green in Washington, D.C., and teaches vaccine law at George Washington University.