I could make a case for the way today’s South operated — but it would be a hospital case.

South’s rebid of four spades was wrong. The jump to game should show good spades but a lack of controls in the unbid suits. South would suggest playing at game unless North’s hand looked good for slam. South should have jumped to three spades, forcing.

Maybe North didn’t trust his partner. He moved on with a five-club cue bid. When South showed his ace of hearts, North signed off, but South bid slam anyway.

West led a heart: four, ten, ace. South then drew trumps and let the jack of diamonds ride. East gratefully took his king and cashed his king of hearts.

North didn’t like anything about the deal — and said so.

“You might as well have bid seven spades. If I’d held solid diamonds and the ace of clubs, I would have bid seven, so you know that making six will depend on a finesse.

“You misplayed also,” North went on. “Give yourself two chances. After you draw trumps, lead a diamond to the ace. When the king falls, you have the rest. If it doesn’t, you finesse in clubs to get a heart discard.”

“I didn’t like my bidding,” South admitted, “but I would never play the slam that way. It might cost a second undertrick.”

North was right. South’s “expectancy” — how many points he will gain or lose in the long run by combining his chances in the minor suits — is less important than the psychological loss his partnership will suffer if he loses a makeable slam.